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“It’s political economy, stupid!” There is probably no better way to express our
increasing frustration caused by the avalanche of commentaries on the Weiss
judgment by the German Constitutional Court published since May 5th. Predictably,
journalists, pundits and esteemed colleagues alike have focused on the most
spectacular aspects of the judgment: the open challenge to the primacy doctrine,
“judicial dialogue” turned into sour antagonism, the prospect of the governments
most prone to authoritarianism turning the Weiss doctrine to their own advantage or
the announced launch of an infringement procedure by the European Commission.
Even at this late stage in the game, we would like to warn against framing the debate
on Weiss exclusively in terms of who has the ultimate authority or Kompetenz-
Kompetenz (important as this issue is) in the European Union. The situation is too
serious to be addressed with the unproductive categories of the past. The last thing
we need is another discussion about constitutional pluralism, or for that matter, about
which court is best, silently accepting the judicialisation of European politics that is
as much a part of the cause as it is the cure of Europe’s maladies.
A more fruitful way to understand Weiss is to view it through the lens of political
economy. From this perspective, neither court is on the money and neither court
does or can offer a cure to the underlying problems in the Eurozone. On the
contrary, they are both essentially offering different ways of maintaining or re-
establishing a status quo that is untenable. What the conflict does indeed serve is
to highlight the fundamental dysfunctionality of EMU as currently configured and the
fact that muddling through is no longer a viable option. In the best case scenario it
may focus minds on the fact that either a reform of the Treaties (and the domestic
constitutions that underpin it) is required to create a genuine fiscal centre or to
pursue a coordinated dismantling of monetary union with the formation of a looser
structure.
Market logic, asymmetries and divisions
In order to explain why, we must first situate the judgment in its context, namely the
protracted financial, economic and fiscal crises that Europe has experienced since
2007, now amplified by the Covid-19 pandemic. These massive challenges have
found the European Union as a whole, and the Eurozone in particular, entangled in
a set of institutional structures, decision-making procedures and substantive norms
designed to solve (if at all) a very different set of problems from those facing Europe
today. European economic governance was built on the belief that the stability of the
euro as a currency could be ensured without the support of common supranational
institutions, or what amounts to the same, that the euro could be the first modern
money without a state. As a result, the design of the Eurozone lacks all the means
and levers needed to stabilise an unhinged European economy. This constitutes
a huge problem because the current double shock (to both supply and demand)
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calls for massive public intervention aimed at strengthening public health care
systems and protecting core productive capacities (first by means of “hibernating”
the economy, then relaunching and – we would insist–deeply reforming it, when the
worst of the health crisis is over).
It is true that Union institutions have “suspended” the application of competition
and fiscal rules that pre-empt public intervention in the economy. Competition law
rules precluding state aid have been virtually put on hold that even “temporary” en
masse nationalisations are now possible. Fiscal rules setting ceilings on deficits
and debts have been set aside for an indefinite period of time (here and here). As
a result, states can (and indeed are strongly advised) to spend as if there was no
tomorrow (or so we are told). Yet, how are these same states supposed to fund such
expenditure?
In this crucial regard, there is much less of a break with the “Maastricht” rules of
the game. In this understanding of “sound fiscal policy”, the revenue of states is not
only to be conditioned by the political process (taxes) but also, and more critically,
to be disciplined by the financial markets (debt). Consequently, states are prohibited
from imposing compulsory loans (Article 124 TFUE) or from enjoying the benefit of
central banks acting as purchasers and lenders of last resort (Article 123 TFUE).
In other words, credit should only be enjoyed under “market conditions” (for the
European Court of Justice, see Pringle, par. 135; Gauweiler, par. 114; for the
German Constitutional Court, see for example Weiss, par. 201-2).
In present circumstances, this framework results in major defects, one which is very
tangible in the short term, another which may materialise in the longer-term. To
start with the short-term. When facing capital markets, EU member states display a
remarkably unequal capacity to raise resources and, as a consequence, to service
their debt. This is so for two related reasons. First, the impact of the crisis is and
may remain deeply asymmetric (see also here). Worst hit are the countries with
large tourism, transport and retail service sectors, and in which remote work is
less feasible. Second, previous levels of debt lead to very different conditions of
access to credit. As a result of these two factors, the simple unleashing of the
financial power of states without taking note of the unevenness of such capacity
runs the risk of accelerating divergences within the European Union, and especially
within the Eurozone. And indeed, 52% of the total aid so far authorised has been
granted to German companies. The European Commission has started to sound
the alarm about the impact that this may have on the single market; fundamentally,
it is European integration as a whole that is at stake. Then there is a second and
more fundamental problem in the longer-term. If the crises were to last longer than
analysts expect (a far from improbable scenario), all states, and not only those in the
Eurozone periphery, may end up having serious problems in financing their public
debt. To put it bluntly, would there be buyers if, in the middle of a deep recession
revealing the fictitious character of large amounts of accumulated capital, all Member
States wanted to place new debt to the value of 20% of their GDP in the market for
the next two years, in addition to the amount that they would have to issue to roll
over debt reaching maturity?
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While there is in principle a strong case for centralised intervention to correct the
asymmetries, the last months have seen the return of longstanding discussions
between national governments on the most adequate instruments and future
courses of action. An ongoing conflict has emerged between countries (mainly
from Southern and Western Europe) supporting the idea of an EU fiscal response
that would imply some degree of transnational solidarity and other countries (from
Northern and Eastern Europe) accepting transfers only in the forms of loans assisted
by conditionality measures (a repeat, thus, of the response to the fiscal crises of
the 2010s). It is no mystery that both sides have their own agendas and see the
Covid-19 crisis as a window of opportunity to push forward long-standing goals: the
completion of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with supranational fiscal policies
for the first group, the transformation of Southern economic and social models in
the light of the neoliberal paradigm that has inspired the Union at least since the
Maastricht Treaty (if not since the late seventies) for the second.
Enter the ECB and Weiss
European countries have so far managed to survive the latest crisis essentially
because the European Central Bank established a provisional safety-net at the
beginning of the pandemic, acting at the very limits of its powers (and, most
probably, beyond them). After some initial hesitations, the ECB not only expanded its
second round of quantitative easing by more than 300 billion euros, but also adopted
the so-called Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), an extraordinary
plan worth 750 billion euros that has bought enough time to ensure that the
struggling national economies and EMU as a whole live to see another day. PEEP is
very bold by European standards: unlike the initial quantitative easingprogrammes,
it departs from the principle that acquisitions have to be undertaken in proportion
to the “capital key” of each Member State, that is, by the percentage in which they
participate in the capital of the ECB. Consequently, no limit is established on the
relative weight of bonds purchased from a single state.
However, compared with the programmes adopted by other central banks (here
and (here), PEPP remains limited and doesn’t even raise the prospect of direct
monetary financing (in theory, the ECB could sell the bonds acquired at the time
of its choosing). The ghost of “sound public finance” undoubtedly still haunts the
Eurozone. As such, it haunts the Weiss saga, just as it did the Gauweiler saga
before it.
The same principle of “sound public finance” underlies whatever methodological
differences exist between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg. Their confrontation on the
division or proportional exercise of competences reflects differences in opinion about
how the ECB should be checked so as to respect this principle. From a political
economy perspective, the reasoning of the two courts largely overlaps by concealing
the fundamental dysfunctionality at the heart of EMU.
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Justification: not just a matter of detail
Since its Maastricht ruling, Karlsruhe has assumed a clear and fast line in the
European economic constitution between monetary policy on the one hand and
fiscal policy on the other. At stake is the preservation of the Bundestag’s fiscal
autonomy, which may be eroded through a lax interpretation of monetary policy by
an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy. These arguments are not without
weight. Unfortunately,  as federal practice shows, delimiting the spheres of power
by reference to a rigid determination of competences may simply be impossible. As
advocate general Cruz Villalón already stated in his conclusions in Gauweiler, there
is no easy way of drawing the line between fiscal and monetary policy, because
monetary policy cannot but be part of general economic policy (par. 129 Conclusions
in Gauweiler). We add that drawing one clear line between the two policies does not
result in clarity, but rather in ideological obfuscation of the underlying problems, and
of the incompatibility of the current economic constitution with democratic and social
commitments across the Eurozone.
The Court of Justice reinstated the distinction, minimising the “indirect effects” on
economic policy and protecting PSPP by asserting its proportionality in relation to
its monetary policy objectives. This is what triggered a bold response from the GCC,
which came close to characterising the Court of Justice’s proportionality review as a
sham. The Luxembourg Court had utilised proportionality to perform a limited review,
deferring to the technical authority of the ECB (“nothing more can be required”
than a careful and accurate use of its expertise). Karlsruhe denounced the lack of
any due identification and balancing of the opposing interests – without including
economic policy effects in the balance, proportionality is nothing short of an outright
empowerment of the ECB, enabling it to “decide on its own competence”. The
different approaches of the two Courts on proportionality along with the fundamental
question of how far a court should restrict the discretion of an independent institution
by engaging in strict judicial review will keep public lawyers busy for a long time to
come.
These are not small matters. But they are, in important ways, irrelevant. Any ‘correct’
answer to questions of legal methodology in conducting proportionality review in
the current legal framework will have very little bearing on the question of how
to fashion democratically and effectively programmes of intervention. The legal
arguments of the Court of Justice protected the heavy architecture of EMU that
emerged from the sovereign debt crisis, of which – by choice of the Union’s political
institutions – the transformation of the ECB’s role since 2012 is a central piece.
The GCC highlighted the weaknesses and limits of those arguments. In doing so,
it also revealed the democratic and legal defects of that same architecture (if more
arguments were needed…). Yes, the judicial dispute illustrates important differences
in position on the application of proportionality, whether it should be used as a tool of
empowerment or of constraint. There is much to be said and to criticize about both
positions and both judgments. Yet a simple modification of the reasoning of the ECB
that would come close to complying with the proportionally strictures dictated by the
GCC will not calm the waters or lead to a continuation of business as usual. How
can the ECB provide a justification of PSPP, accounting for its monetary, economic
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and social effects – a justification to enable proper parliamentary control of its
programmes – without admitting that doing “whatever it takes” means doing what the
Treaty currently prohibits? Without showing that maintaining “sound public finance” is
a contortionist trick that is performed at the expense of democratic choices?
Muddle through, reform or unravel?
So, what are the concrete implications of the Weiss judgment when viewed from
the standpoint of political economy? The judgment not only establishes stringent
constraints on the capacity of the ECB to pursue monetary policy in the way that it
recently has. It also threatens the future PEPP programme. It may not have killed it,
and, by the time it reaches the Court (by the same parties challenging the PSPP),
PEPP may have already done its job. What it does threaten is the very concept
of the PEPP and, more broadly, any prospect of using monetary policy in creative
ways to compensate for the Union’s lack of robust fiscal policy instruments. In other
words, the GCC’s gamble keeps alive the bid to limit the EU’s powers and to limit
other state’s fiscal room for manoeuvre, precisely at a time that the coronavirus crisis
wrecks the regulatory ideal of “sound public finance”.
There is, however, a silver lining. Even the harshest critics of the timing, logic and
tone of the German Constitutional Court’s ruling have to acknowledge that it forces
the European Union to face some fundamental and perhaps existential issues.
To be sure, the most likely scenario is that the EU will come up with the umpteenth
fudge to muddle through, the most obvious possibility being the adoption of
macroeconomic adjustment programmes in Southern European countries backed
by the ECB’s OMT programme. In this respect, the Weiss judgment reveals a high
degree of political awareness on the side of German constitutional judges because
it strengthens the minority position of the Bundesbank within the Governing Council
of the ECB and favours the preferred outcome of Northern and Eastern European
countries since the beginning of the crisis. But if that is the outcome, the chances
of an uncoordinated implosion of the Eurozone would dramatically increase, as any
measure of fresh austerity imposed upon peripheral States will be literally explosive.
And yet the ongoing crisis and the Weiss judgment may also open a window to
reconsider EMU. Even if the GCC had not intervened, it remains the case that
central banks can only buy time, and that there are limits to the effectiveness of
monetisation (resulting from the unavoidable link between money and the productive
capacity of an economy). From that perspective, the Weiss judgment represents a
major opportunity and, perhaps, a moment of truth.
We have reached a point at which the status quo and muddling through have
become untenable. The serious options available to the Eurozone have shrunk to
two: reform or dismantle. Either to reshape EMU in the form of a sustainable and fair
economic and monetary union or else put all efforts into organising the coordinated
dismantling of monetary union and formation of a looser structure. In both cases, a
rupture is called for.
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A genuine economic and monetary union requires establishing both a “fiscal
centre” with fiscal capacity to meet the challenge of solidaristic reconstruction and
transformation of the economy, and a central bank capable of acting as buyer and
lender of last resort, under the supervision of the European Parliament and the
Council. A looser monetary infrastructure involves a successful, hopefully happy
divorce, undertaken in such a way that solidarity can be reinforced rather than
undermined in its aftermath. In both cases, it would be necessary to break the taboo
of EU Treaty revision, and probably also domestic constitutional change, not least to
the German Basic Law.
The merits of the Weiss judgment could be precisely to open up this kind of
debate about European integration in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Past
experience has taught us that the idea of a stability community as designed in the
Treaties works only at the expense of the democratic and social constitution (here,
here and here). Past and present experience also shows the necessity of using
macroeconomic instruments that are part of the social democratic tradition and
which EU rules constrain. If those are now required again, there are only two ways to
harness them: either by aligning EMU to democratic and social ends or unravelling
EMU to restore democratic and social constitutionalism at the national level. Tertium
non datur. Se non ora, quando?
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